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Critical Security History: (De)Securitization, Ontological 
Security and Insecure Memories 
 
Abstract: This article makes a case for incorporating the concept of ‘Critical Security History’ 
(CSH) into security studies. While history plays a powerful role in a cornucopia of security stories, 
we contend that it often goes unnoticed in scholarly research and teaching. Against this backdrop, 
we present a detailed way to study how history is told and enacted in non-linear ways. To do this, 
the article outlines how CSH can contribute to securitization and ontological security studies. As 
shown, this lens casts a new light on the legacies of (de)securitization processes and how they are 
commemorated. It also illustrates that ontological security studies have only begun to call into 
question the concept of historicity. Working through these observations, the article marshals 
insights from Halvard Leira’s notion of ‘engaged historical amateurism’ to entice scholars 
interested in ‘doing’ CSH. While acknowledging that this research agenda is hard to achieve, our 
study of the 2012 Sarajevo Red Line project helps to illustrate the added value of trying to ‘do’ 
CSH in theory and in practice. We end with some reflections for future research and continued 
conversations.  
 












On 08 May 2018 Valentin Inzko, the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, warned the 
United Nations Security Council that progress in this country could not be taken for granted.1 
Speaking candidly about rising political tensions, he registered explicit concern about,  
 
“[…] the recent readiness among some politicians to refer to the possibility of 
a renewed conflict, including controversial statements by senior Bosniak 
politicians suggesting that a rearming effort was underway to ‘respond’ in case 
of a hypothetical war”.2   
 
The fact that rearmament3 and renewed conflict cannot be dismissed over a decade after the end of 
the 1995 conflict that resulted in the death of an estimated 100,000 people is alarming.4 It also 
illustrates that history does not simply reside in the past. On the contrary, Inzko’s report reveals 
that the boundaries between what happened ‘then’ and what is happening ‘now’ are hard to draw 
with any precision. The events that he documented also weave the past, present and future together. 
Evidently, what happened ‘then’ and what is happening ‘now’ will actively inform how this country 
will negotiate process of collectives remembering and reconciliation going forward.  
This article is prompted by a wish to explore how histories are never fully secure. At first 
glance, this objective may appear to be too simple. Everyone knows that history does not abide to 
a linear arc even if victors construct it. It is also plain that “facts do not speak for themselves”.5 On 
the contrary, a wide canon of scholarly work has already exposed how histories are told, 
remembered and forgotten in selective ways.6As Jenny Edkins put it, “producing a narrative is a 
                                                 
1 Several other empirical case studies and post-conflict sites could obviously have been chosen to make this point. We 
selected Valentin Inzko report as a way to create empirical consistency with our discussion of Sarajevo Red Line Project 
later on the article.  
2 UN News, “‘Fabric of Society’ at Risk in Bosnia and Herzegovina, UN Security Council told”, (2018): Available at 
<https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/05/1009182> (accessed 10/09/18).  
3 In early 2018 concerns were raised over an increase in arm sales to the Bosnian Serb police. See Julian Borger, “Arms 
shipment to Bosnian Serbs stokes EU fears”, (2018), “The Guardian, 13 February: Available 
at<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/13/bosnian-serb-police-arms-purchase-stokes-eu-fears> (accessed 
10/09/18).  
4 United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, “Case: Bosnia-Herzegovina”, (2018): Available at 
<https://www.ushmm.org/confront-genocide/cases/bosnia-herzegovina > (accessed 10/09/18).  
5 Molly Andrews, “Shaping History: Narratives of Political Change” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 
p. 2. This point resonates with Cox’s famous claim that, “[t]heory is always for someone and for some purpose”. See 
Robert W. Cox, “Approaches to World Order” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 87 emphasis in 
original.  
6 See, among others, Claire Alexander, ‘Contested Memories: The Shahid Minar and the Struggle for Diasporic Space’ 
Ethnic and Racial Studies 36:4 (2013), p. 590-610; Duncan Bell (eds), Memory, Trauma and World Politics: Reflections 
on the Relationship between Past and Preset (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Stephen Hopkins, ‘The 
Chronicles of Long Kesh: Provisional Irish Republican Memoirs and the Contested Memory of Hunger Strikes’, Memory 
Studies, 7:4 (2014), p. 425-439; Maria Mälksoo, ‘Criminalizing Communism: Transnational Mnemopolitics in Europe’, 
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form of forgetting”. 7  Related works have shown that processes of memorialisation and 
commemoration are sites of political power struggles. As Jay Winter surmises, “a cacophony is 
inevitable”. 8  However, the former bodies of work tend to pay less attention to the specific 
entanglement of history and security. What is equally surprising is that very few critical security 
studies scholars have explicitly foregrounded the intricate interrelations that exist between history 
and security. Certainly Thierry Balzacq’s claim that, “every securitization is a historical process 
that occurs between antecedent influential set of events and their impact on interactions; that 
involves concurrent acts carrying reinforcing or aversive consequences for securitization” remains 
overlooked. 9  Arguably then both sets of literature fall short of offering a CSH conceptual 
framework.   
Recently, Brent J. Steele sketched what this kind of framework might entail.10 One of his 
studies focused on how the United States collectively ‘remembers’ the atomic bombings as being 
‘necessary’ to ‘save lives’ that would have otherwise been lost in an invasion of the Japanese main 
islands. According to Steele, however, this process of collective remembering reinforces powerful 
security logics and ‘master narratives’11 that justify the use of overwhelming force in wars.12 To 
disrupt these linkages he draws from additional historical accounts. This generates alternative ‘if-
then’ propositions that allow readers to imagine another cause for why the Japanese surrendered.13 
In a follow-up study, Steele noted that CSH would involve, “focusing on the ways in which history 
is recalled and remembered”.14 However, neither of his studies bring different critical security 
approaches into conversation with each other. Nor do they fully address the inherent difficulties 
posed by doing CSH in theory and in practice. 
To overcome these limitations, this article engages with two central approaches in critical 
security studies – securitization and ontological security. Obviously, these are not the only two 
approaches we could have chosen. Postcolonial security studies continue to challenge Western 
                                                 
International Political Sociology, 8:1(2014): p. 82-99; Jay Winter, Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War 
in European Cultural History (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014).  
7 Jenny Edkins, Trauma and the Memory of Politics (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 113. 
8 Jay Winter, ‘Film and the Matrix of Memory’, The American Historical Review, 106: 3 (2001), p. 864. 
9 Thierry Balzacq, ‘A Theory of Securitization: Origins, Core Assumptions, and Variants’ in Thierry Balzacq (eds) 
Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve (London, Routledge, 2011), p. 14.  
10 Brent Steele, “Maintaining (US) Collective Memory: From Hiroshima to a Critical Study of Security History”, Critical 
Studies of Security, 1:1 (2013), p. 83-100; Brent J. Steele, “Critical Security History and Hiroshima”, Critical Studies on 
Security, 3: 3 (2016): 303-307. 
11 There are multiple and competing ways to define ‘dominant’, ‘prevalent’, ‘hegemonic’ and/or ‘grand narratives’. Our 
conceptualisation of a ‘master narrative’ draws directly on the work of Paul Nesbitt-Larking who defines them as, 
“socially embedded and broadly shared frameworks of knowledge and experience that are understood and communicated 
in the form of stories”. See Paul Nesbitt–Larking, “The Ideological Work of Narratives”, Political Psychology 38(3): 
(2017), p. 571-578.  
12 Steele, Maintaining (US) Collective Memory, 83. 
13 Ibid, p.96. 
14 Steele, ‘Critical Security History and Hiroshima’, p. 304-305. 
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centric accounts of history and International Relations.15 As Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey point 
out, ‘Eurocentric historical geographies and periodisations are very much in evidence in the 
common narratives of world history that underpin security studies’. 16 Feminist security studies 
have also sought to challenge hegemonic and masculinized histories.17 Cynthia Enloe, for instance, 
purposefully documents wartime lives that, “make it harder for listeners to deny that Iraqi women 
had their own stories”. 18  In sync, poststructural security studies explicitly interrogate and 
deconstruct historical narratives and the insecurity they create. 19  For similar reasons David 
Campbell argues that, “to proclaim the end of the cold war assumes that we know what the cold 
war was”.”20  A systematic presentation of how CSH could and should engage with all these 
approaches is beyond the scope of our study. Yet we do hope that this article will provide an 
invitation for such studies to be undertaken. In short, this piece represents the start of ongoing CSH 
conversations rather than a definitive end. Read in this way, our article offers a particularly 
promising avenue to break down oppositional thinking across the field of critical security studies.21   
Before outlining how the present article contributes to securitization and ontological 
security studies it is necessary to explain why these two security approaches were selected.22 First, 
both fields of study have been influenced by central zeitgeist of critical security studies – namely 
that security is social construct that is inescapably open to contestation. Working from this baseline, 
                                                 
15 See, for example, Anna M. Agathangelou & L.H.M. Ling, ‘Postcolonial Dissidence within Dissident IR: Transforming 
Master Narratives of Sovereignty in Greco-Turkish Cyprus’, Studies in Political Economy 54:1 (1997), p. 7-38; Neta C. 
Crawford, Argument and change in World Politics: Ethics, Decolonization and Humanitarian Intervention (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002); John M. Hobson and Alina Sajed, ‘Navigating Beyond the Eurofetishist Frontier of 
Critical IR Theory: Exploring the Complex Landscapes of Non-Western Agency’, International Studies Review 19:4 
(2017): p. 547-572; Edward W. Said, Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1995);  
Robbie Shilliam, Race and the Underserving Poor: From Abolition to Brexit (Columbia University Press, 2018).  
16 Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey, ‘The Postcolonial Moment in Security Studies’, Review of International Studies 32: 
2 (2006), p.334. 
17 See, for example, Matthew Kearns, ‘Gender, Visuality and Violence: Visual Securitization and the 2001 War in 
Afghanistan’, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 19:4 (2017), p. 491-505; Meredith Loken  and Anna Zelenz, 
‘Explaining Extremism Western women in Daesh’, European Journal of International Security, 3:1 (2017), p. 45-68; 
Annick T.R. Wibben, Feminist Security Studies (London: Routledge, 2011), p. 4-10. 
18 Cynthia Enloe, Nimo’s War, Emma’s War: Making Feminist Sense of the Iraq War (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2010), p. xi. 
19 David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (University of Minnesota 
Press, 1992); Roxanne Doty, Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North-South Relations 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996); Lene Hansen, Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the 
Bosnian War (London: Routledge, 2006). 
20 David Campbell, Writing Security, p. 15. In the same passage, he also acknowledges that, “In considering the issue of 
where we go from here, there is a tendency to uncritically accept a particular story of how we got to be here”.  
21 See, for example, c.a.s.e. Collective, ‘Critical Approaches to Security in Europe: A Networked Manifesto’, Security 
Dialogue 37:3(2006), p. 443-487; Faye Donnelly, ‘Critical Security Studies and Alternative Dialogues for Peace: 
Reconstructing “Language Barriers” and “Talking Points” in Oliver P. Richmond et al (eds), The Palgrave Handbook of 
Disciplinary and Regional Approaches to Peace (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016); Lene Hansen, ‘Conclusion: 
Towards an Ontopolitics of Security’ in Thierry Balzacq (eds), Contesting Security: Strategies and Logics (New York: 
Routeldge, 2015), p. 219- 231; Juha A. Vuori, Critical Security and Chinese Politics: The anti-Falungong Campaign, 
(New York: Routeldge, 2014), p .1.  
22 We would like to thank the reviewers for asking us to elaborate on our selection process.  
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securitization and ontological security scholars have highlighted the powerful role played by 
language, images23 and material actants.24 All of these features are compatible with our attempt to 
develop a more robust CSH approach. Second, we argue that securitization and ontological security 
approaches contain a limited focus on history that can be further developed via CSH. Engaging 
with securitization, for instance, reminds us that the legacies of (de)securitization are all difficult 
to leave behind or navigate going forwards. Turning towards ontological security studies we 
remake the case for starting with the concept of ‘historicity’ left unproblematized and unpacked in 
earlier studies.25   
 The remainder of article proceeds as follows. First, we make a case for why CSH is 
necessary to unpack causal historical narratives in IR. The next section focuses on the implications 
of putting history center stage in the lively debates occurring in securitization studies. The third 
section explores the productive inroads that become possible when CSH and ontological security 
are put into conversation with one another. Building on Halvard Leira’s notion of ‘engaged 
historical amateurism’ 26  the final section reflects on the 2012 Sarajevo Red Line project to 
tentatively illustrate how these ideas might be put into action. The conclusion draw together the 
major claims of the article and reflects on how to continue CSH conversations in critical security 
studies and beyond.  
 
 
                                                 
23  See, for example, Lene Hansen, ‘Theorizing the Image for Security Studies: Visual Securitization and the Muhammad 
Cartoon Crisis’, European Journal of International Relations, 17:1 (2011), p. 51-74; Axel Heck and Gabi Schlag, 
‘Securitizing Images: The Female Body and the War in Afghanistan’, European Journal of International Relations, 19:4 
(2012), p. 891-913; Benjamin J. Muller (Dis)qualified bodies: Securitization, Citizenship and ‘Identity 
Management’, Citizenship Studies, 8:3 (2004), p. 279-294; Michael C. Williams, ‘Words, Images, Enemies: 
Securitization and International Politics’, International Studies Quarterly, 47:4 (2003), p. 511-531. On the relationship 
between ontological security and images see Christine Agius ’Drawing the Discourses of Ontological Security: 
Immigration and Identity in the Danish and Swedish cartoon crises’, Cooperation and Conflict, 52:1(2017)p., 109-125; 
Brent J Steele, ‘Ideals that were really never in our possession': Torture, Honor and US Identity’, International 
Relations 22: 2 (2008), p243-261. 
24  In securitization studies see Claudia Aradau, ‘Security that Matters: Critical Infrastructure and the Politics of 
Protection’, Security Dialogue, 41: 5 (2010), p. 491-514; Stephan J. Baele, Thierry Balzacq and Philippe Bourbeau, 
‘Numbers in Global Security Governance’, European Journal of International Security, 3:1 (2017), p. 22-44; ; Michael 
Guggenheim, ‘Building Memory: Architecure, Networks, Users’, Memory Studies; 2:1 (2009), p. 39- 53; ; Iver B. 
Neuman, ‘Halting Time: Monuments to Alterity’, Millennium, 46: 3 (2018), p. 331-351.  In ontological security studies, 
see Filip Ejdus, ‘Not a heap of stones’: Material Environments and Ontological Security in International 
Relations,  Cambridge Review of International Affairs 30: 1 (2017), p. 23-43. Bahar Rumellili, "Identity and 
Desecuritisation: The Pitfalls of Conflating Ontological and Physical Security’Journal of International Relations and 
Development 18: 1 (2015), p. 52-74. 
25  See Jakob Eberle, ‘Narrative, Desire, Ontological security, Transgression: Fantasy as a factor in International 
Politics’, Journal of International Relations and Development, Online First View (2017), p. 1-26; Marco A Vieira, “(Re-
)imagining the ‘Self’ of Ontological Security: The Case of Brazil’s Ambivalent Postcolonial 
Subjectivity”, Millennium, 46:2 (2018), p. 142-164. 
26 Halvard Leira, ‘International Relations Pluralism and History—Embracing Amateurism to Strengthen the Profession’, 
International Studies Perspectives, 16:1 (2015), p. 23-31.  
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Making a Case for Critical Security History  
 
  Conceptually, the meaning of critical security history is layered. By design, it seeks to 
acknowledge that history is inescapably told, experienced, remembered and felt differently by 
different groups of people at different points in time. This is why David L. Blaney and Naeem 
Inayatullah sought to make, “a conversation of equal but different cultures” possible.27 Motivated 
by a similar goal, CSH seeks to carve out spaces in which alternative voices, stories, memories and 
feelings can surface. At its core, it is ‘critical’28 in its skepticism of causality and unproblematic 
historical storylines. Ironically, however, CSH also calls us to take causality very seriously, perhaps 
much more seriously than the ways in which it is casually invoked by political leaders and/or 
laypeople and/or social scientists. As Milja Kurki argues, “we can, in fact, think of causation as a 
‘common-sensical’ intuitive notion with a multiplicity of different meanings, none of which entail 
laws or determinism”. 29  
 CSH engages causal historical narratives through two levels of analysis. The thinner, and 
far more common, critique challenges the dominant ‘cause’ of a historical event by proposing a 
different one. Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry 1992 study falls into this category. 
Challenging the storylines espoused by the ‘Reagan Victory School’30, they simply moved to study 
other causes. By extension, their ‘new’ perspective foregrounded additional factors, including 
Mikhail Gorbachev’s reform efforts and the ‘increasingly superior performance of the Western 
economic system’, to determine why the Cold War ended and who ‘won’.31 
 Most ‘critical’ security history is of this nature – exchanging one cause for another. 
Actually, Hidemi Suganami believes that all social scientific explanations rely on some form of 
                                                 
27 David L. Blaney and Naeem Inayatullah, ‘Prelude to a Conversation of Cultures in International Society? Todorov and 
Nandy on the Possibility of Dialogue’, Alternatives, Global, Local, Political, 19:1 (1994), p.29.  
28 The term ‘critical’ has many different meanings in IR. Some even argue that critical theory overlaps with problem 
solving theory. See, for example, John M. Hobson, ‘Is critical theory always for the white West and for Western 
imperialism? Beyond Westphilian towards a post-racist critical IR’, Review of International Studies 33:1 (2007), p. 91-
116. In this article, we use the term ‘critical’ as it is invoked within critical security studies writ larger and write small. 
Ultimately, what is at stake in these ongoing debates is a call for scholars to acknowledge that security cannot be told in 
one way, that our current stories are unequal and that we all have to engage in a lifelong project of being reflexive if we 
are to uncover and disrupt granted ‘master-narratives’ that envelop our work and in our lives. See, for example, 
Christopher Browning and Matt McDonald, ‘The Future of Critical Security Studies: Ethics and the Politics of Security’, 
European Journal of International Security 19: 2(2011), p. 235-55; Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (eds), ‘Critical 
Security Studies: Concepts and Cases (London: University College London Press); David Mutimer, Kyle Grayson & J. 
Marshall Beier, ‘Critical Studies on Security: an introduction’, Critical Studies on Security, 1:1 (2013), p.1-12.  
29 Milja Kurki, ‘Causes of a Divided Discipline: Rethinking the Concept of Cause in International Relations Theory’, 
Review of International Studies 32:2 (2006), p.190. 
30 This ‘School’ of thought credited the end of the Cold war victory to Reagan’s military buildup and the ideological 
assertiveness he undertook during the 1980s that led to bankrupting the Soviet Union. For further information see Alan 
P. Dobson, ‘The Reagan Administration, Economic Warfare, and Starting to Close Down the Cold War’, Diplomatic 
History, 29:1(2005), p. 531–556.  
31 Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, ‘Who Won the Cold War?’, Foreign Policy, (1992), p. 136. 
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narration like this.32 Yet this thin type of CSH still accepts that causes can be linked to outcomes. 
The problem with this kind of positivist explanation is that it overlooks the ways in which these 
causal narratives become politicized and mobilized. Put another way, it occludes the reflexive 
feedback loops that occur between the subjects and objects of politics.33 Once again Deudney and 
Ikenberry argument epitomizes this limitation. In the end, they were interested in reconsidering, 
‘the emerging conventional wisdom before it truly becomes an article of faith on Cold War history 
and comes to distort the thinking of policymakers in America and elsewhere’.34 
 Lucian Ashworth’s engagement with the ‘Appeasement’ myth35 provides a richer template 
for critiquing historical narratives and the tendency, “[t]o tell the story as though the ending is an 
inevitability”.36 Although it is not explicitly labelled as a CSH study, he seeks to challenge the 
historiography of IR by calling our attention to contingency.37 As Ashworth argues, “it does not 
matter how in tune with the realities of power you are [when] the complexities of human political 
life can often give a high premium to plain dumb luck”.38 That said, Ashworth deploys contingency 
to call out the importance of agency versus structure in historical narratives. 39  Naturally, we 
welcome his focus on agency as a key factor shaping the drive to deploy causal narratives. Even 
so, we believe that the restating and reinforcement of narratives can happen through the interplay 
of agency and structure.  
 The limitations outlined above alert us to the fact that Steele’s accounts still offer the best 
place to begin considering how to create, “a cottage field of critical studies on security history”.40 
Nevertheless, as noted in the introduction, his accounts also need to be developed. First, it is helpful 
to extend his analysis by illustrating how a CSH perspective can enrich and converse with different 
CSS approaches. This is the purpose of the next two sections. Understanding this pursuit also makes 
it necessary for scholars to analyse, “the various places and spaces where historical interpretations 
are reinforced and/or disrupted”.41 The final section of the article is thus dedicated to pinpointing 
                                                 
32 Hidemi Suganami, ‘Narrative Explanation and International Relations: Back to Basics’, Millennium 37:2 (2008), p. 
327-356. 
33  Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and its 
Implications for the Study of World Politics (London: Routledge, 2011). 
34 Deudney and Ikenberry, “Who won the Cold War?”, p. 124 emphasis added. 
35 Lucian Ashworth, A History of International Thought: From the Origins of the Modern State to Academic International 
Relations (London: Routledge, 2014). 
36 Ashworth, A History of International Thought, p. 194.  
37 Also see Duncan Bell, ‘Writing the World: Disciplinary History and Beyond’, International Affairs, 85:1 (2009), p.3-
22; Benjamin De Carvalho, Halvard Leira and John M. Hobson, ‘The Big Bangs of IR: The Myths that your Teachers 
still tell you about 1648 and 1919’, Millennium 39:3 (2011), p. 735-758.  
38 Ibid., p. 194 emphasis added. 
39 Ibid., p. 195. 
40 Steele, ‘Critical Security History and Hiroshima’, p.  304. 
41 Ibid., p. 305 
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one illustrative case study – the 2012 Sarajevo Red Line project - where security and history are 
mutually reinforcing yet highly contested.  
 
Looking for Critical Security History in Securitization Studies 
 
According to the Copenhagen School, security pivots around the social construction of 
threats. Adopting a speech act approach, they analyse how agents speak security to convince 
audiences that extraordinary measures may need to be used to ensure the survival of a valued 
referent object.42 While advancing this agenda, however, the Copenhagen School openly caution 
against security being “idealized”.43 Desecuritization is therefore presented as an, “optimal-long 
range” strategy for returning issues back into the political realm.44 The inclusion of this exit strategy 
in their original framework implies that they never intended for securitization to last forever. 
Jumping to this conclusion, however, does not helps us to consider the legacies of securitization, 
let alone how they are selectively remembered and forgotten. What happens if securitized processes 
of the past seep into desecuritization strategies? What if securitization create toxic memories that 
cannot be erased? What happens when older securitization process are ritualistically 
commemorated? As demonstrated below, CSH offers an excellent opportunity to explore these 
questions.  
In parallel, it is well placed to contributes to ‘second generations’ claims that 
(de)securitization does not unfold in a linear way.45 Subsequent literature has framed securitization 
                                                 
42 Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap De Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
1998). 
43 Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde, Security, p. 29. 
44 It is important to note that other scholars are advancing alternative ways for us to move out of security. These do not 
neatly coincide with the Copenhagen School’s discussion of desecuritization. See, among others, Claudia Aradau, 
‘Security and the Democratic Scene: Desecuritization and the Emancipation’, Journal of International Relations and 
Development, 7:4 (2004), p. 388-413; Andreas Behnke, ‘No way out: Desecuritization, Emancipation and the Eternal 
return of the political—a reply to Aradau’, Journal of International Relations and Development, 9:1 (2006), p. 62-69; 
Faye Donnelly, ‘The Queen’s Speech: Desecuritizing the past, present and future of Anglo-Irish Relations’, European 
Journal of International Relations, 21:4 (2015),p. 911-934; Lene Hansen, ‘Reconstructing Desecuritization: The 
Normative-Political in the Copenhagen School and Directions for how to Apply it’, Review of International Studies 38:3 
(2012), p. 525-546; Jef Huysmans, ‘The Question of the Limit: Desecuritization and the Aesthetics of Horror in Political 
Realism’, Journal of International Studies, 27:3 (1998), p. 569-589; Xymena Kurowska and Anatoly Reshetnikov, 
‘Neutrollzation: Industrialized Trolling as a pro-Kremlin strategy of Desecuritization’, Security Dialogue, Online First 
(2018), p. 1-19; Megan MacKenzie, ‘Securitization and Desecuritization: Female Soldiers and the Reconstruction of 
Women in post-Conflict Sierra Leone’, Security Studies, 18:2 (2009), p. 241-261.  
45 From a CSH perspective, this claim could easily be connected to ongoing debates about the role of time and temporality 
in IR. See, for example, Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier and Bradford S. Jones, ‘Time is of the Essence: Event History 
Models in Political Science’, American Journal of Political Science 41:4 (1997), p. 1414-61; William A. Callahan, ‘War, 
Shame and Time: Pastoral Governance and National Identity in England and America’, International Studies Quarterly, 
50:2 (2006): 395-419; Andrew R. Hom, ‘Timing is Everything: Toward a Better Understanding of Time and International 
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as an ongoing process with no clear beginning or ending. 46 In this vein, Philippe Bourbeau and 
Juha A. Vuori have suggested that very attention has been paid to instances in which 
“desecuritization arise before security – when securitization is brewing. 47  At the same time, 
Jonathan Luke Austin and Philippe Beaulieu-Brossard have suggested that securitization and 
desecuritization can occur simultaneously.48 For them, simultaneity can occur through ‘splitting 
speech acts’.49  
We believe that CSH complements Bourbeu and Vuori’s attempt to excavate the 
“formative powers” that precede and condition (de)securitization processes from the start. 50 
Nevertheless, one could still clarify how we go about accumulating clues of what counts as ‘prior’ 
and, “where exactly to temporarily locate a [causal] mechanism”.51 From a CSH perspective it is 
essential that we do not romanticize vocabularies that drawn clear lines between (de)securitizing 
moves because we all speak with, “an inherited set of voices”.52 We also propose that CSH pushes 
us to acknowledge that neat splits are almost impossible to accomplish. From this perspective, 
every synergy and/or rupture that emerges during a (de)securitization processes is shaped by an 
unacknowledged yet omnipresent historicity. 
In many ways these discussions collapse back into earlier concerns around the Copenhagen 
School’s approach to context. 53  However, while context has become a buzzword in ‘second 
generation’ debates, far less calls have been made for (de)securitization process to be historicised. 
The point being made here is emphatically not that that history has been completely written out of 
securitization studies. Certainly Matti Jutila has already explore the relationships between history, 
securitization and identity. 54  His work has also identified that, “political actors use various 
                                                 
Politics’, International Studies Quarterly 62:1 (2018), p. 69-79; Ty Solomon, ‘Time and Subjectivity in World Politics’, 
International Studies Quarterly 58:4 (2014), p.671-81.  
46  Donnelly, ‘The Queen’s Speech’, p. 911-934; Holger Stritzel and Sean C. Chang, ‘Securitization and Counter-
securitization in Afghanistan’, Security Dialogue, 46:6 (2015), p. 548-567; Juha A. Vuori, ‘Let’s just say we’d like to 
avoid any Great Power Entanglements: Desecuritization in post-Mao Chinese Foreign Policy towards Major powers’, 
Global Discourse, 8:1 (2018), p. 118-136. 
47  Philippe Bourbeau and Juha A. Vuori, ‘Security, Resilience and Desecuritization: Multidirectional Moves and 
Dynamics’, Critical Studies on Security 3:3(2015), p. 253-268. 
48 Jonathan Luke Austin, ‘(De)securitization Dilemmas: Theorising the Simultaneous Enaction of Securitization and 
Desecuritization’, Review of International Studies, 44:2(2017), p. 301-323.  
49 Ibid., p. 314-319. 
50 Judith Butler, Excitable speech: A Politics of the Performative (Psychology Press, 1997) p.2. 
51 Stefano Guzzini, ‘Securitization as a Causal Mechanism’, Security Dialogue, 42: 4-5 (2011), p. 337. 
52 Ibid., p. 25. 
53 See, among others, Thierry Balzacq, Sarah Léonard, and Jan Ruzicka, ‘Securitization Revisited: Theory and Cases’, 
International Relations, 30:4 (2015), p. 494 – 531; Felix Ciutä, 'Security and the Problem of Context: a Hermeneutical 
Critique of Securitisation Theory', Review of International Studies 35: 2 (2009): 301-326; Filip Ejdus & Mina Božović, 
‘Grammar, Context and Power: Securitization of the 2010 Belgrade Pride Parade’, Southeast European and Black Sea 
Studies, 17:1 (2017), p. 17-34; Holger Stritzel, ‘Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and beyond’, European 
Journal of International Relations, 13: 3 (2007), pp. 357–83.  
54 Matti Jutila, ‘Securitization, History and Identity: Some Conceptual Clarifications and Examples from Politics of 
Finnish war history’, Nationalities Papers, 43:6 (2015), p. 927-943; Also Jarrod Hayes, Constructing National Security: 
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historical narratives to justify their present position and to build their desired futures”.55 Going 
further still Jutila has asked if history can be securitized.56  
In a similar vein, Bezen Balamir Coskun states that, “historians, as well as the power elite, 
play a significant role in construction and reconstruction of the security discourse”.57 Another trend 
is for historical events and empirical references points to form the backdrop for theorising how 
securitization works in practice. Take for example, Juha A. Vuori’s analysis of the Doomsday 
Clock as a, “longstanding process of securitization in which speech acts have been interwoven with 
a powerful symbol”.58 Elsewhere Maria Mälksoo has begun to, “critically engage the securitization 
of memory as a means of making certain historical remembrances secure by delegitimizing or 
outright criminalizing others”.59  Her conceptualization of mnemonical security allows for the 
possibility that securitization lingers in antagonistic ways that can “produce circular security 
dilemmas”.60  
It is also misplaced to claim that history cannot be brought into securitization studies under 
the rubric of context. ‘Second generation’ debates are not looking for the context in which 
securitization occurs. Instead they are looking for any and every context in which (de)securitization 
is contested, negotiated, imagined, visualised and resisted. 61  Yet, as important as these 
developments are, they can be further developed by centralizing history even more. A cursory 
glance at the exiting debates, for example, illustrates that very few scholars have examined The 
French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars from a securitization perspective.62 What has also not 
been fully acknowledge is that all contexts must be viewed as a, “ritual chain of resignification 
whose origins and end remain unfixed and unfixable”.63  
                                                 
US relations with India and China’ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Jarrod Hayes, ‘Securitization, 
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and Israeli security discourses’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 23:2(2010), p. 285. 
58 Juha A. Vuori, ‘A Timely Prophet? The Doomsday Clock as a Visualization of Securitization Moves with a Global 
Referent Object’, Security Dialogue, 41:3 (2010), p. 255. 
59 Mälksoo, ‘Memory must be defended,’ p. 221. 
60 Ibid., p. 227. 
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Balzacq, Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve (London: Routledge, 2011); Thierry 
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‘Democratic Surveillance in Times of Curiosity’,  European Journal of International Security, 1:1 (2016), p. 73-93. 
62 For an exception see, Camil Fransc Roman, ‘The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars in the Prussian Political 
Imaginary: A Political Anthropological Genealogy of the ‘Special’ German-French relations’, Journal of International 
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 One explanation for why history is not always adequately captured is our preoccupation 
with “securing catastrophic futures”.64 Our hunch, however, is that this line of argument starts to 
unravel very quickly when it is put into a broader context. In the end, futuristic gazes do not make 
history redundant. This is because discussions and visions of the future always interact and coexist 
with past experiences, memories, disputes and struggles. To mention just one example, Martin 
Shaw has noted, “the Second World War remains the main historical reference point for 
understanding contemporary warfare and, relatedly, the international system in the twenty-first 
century”.65 This observation reminds us that war does not simply reside on the battlefield or end. 
Their legacies can linger and be experienced by different people in elusive ways.66 As Duncan Bell 
notes, “the fugitive traces of memory long outlast the sound of the guns”.67 If this point holds, then 
the links between (de)securitization and commemoration warrant much greater attention than they 
are currently afforded.  
Taking these ideas in a slightly different direction brings us in contact with what we term 
mutual (de)securitization processes. While the concept of countermoves and contestation has 
gained a lot of traction in securitization studies far less attention has been given to the layers of 
mutual (re)enactment, (re)telling and (re)calling that are often in play in every securitization 
game.68 Even when securitization is ‘declared’ to be over we still find highly institutionalized, 
choreographed and ritualized process of recalling and reliving what happened during securitization. 
As Maria Mälksoo has already noted, “‘our memory must be defended’ emerges as a variation of 
the omnipresent security discourse, as another ringtone of the familiar ‘society’ must be defended 
‘logic’”. 69  Paying attention to how older securitizations are relived and retold opens up the 
possibility for intergenerational (de)securitization processes through which images, beliefs, 
experiences, objects, lessons, traumas and much more get passed down from one generation to the 
next. These encounters do not have to be explicit. Instead, they may become ‘mundane matters’70 
or ‘little security nothings’71 that become woven into the fabric of our lives in ways that are rarely 
                                                 
64 Claudia Aradau and Rens Van Munster, Politics of Catastrophe: Genealogies of the Unknown (London: Routledge, 
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Sense of the Iraq War. (University of California Press, 2010). 
67 Duncan Bell, ‘Introduction:  Violence and Memory’, Millennium, 38: 2 (2009), p. 348. 
68 For perhaps the best attempt to conceptualise collective speech act see James Sperling and Mark Webber, “NATO and 
The Ukraine Crisis: Collective Securitization”, European Journal of International Security 2: 1(2016): 19-46.  
69 Mälksoo, ‘Memory must be Defended’, p. 222. 
70 Cynthia Enloe, ‘The Mundane Matters’, International Political Sociology, 5:4 (2011), p.447-450. 
71 Huysmans, ‘What’s in an act?, p. 371-383. 
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articulated. For example, by participating in commemorative practices, like wearing a red poppy, 
actors and actant become somewhat complicit in the reproduction of ritualized stories, mythologies 
and ceremonies.  
These observation raises anew the question of whether or not desecuritization is possible. 
For Andreas Behnke the goal is to break the ritualistic chain in order to allow securitization to fade 
away.72 For if we continue to participate in the same securitized game (whether they are historical 
or contemporary) there is a real danger that we never exit securitization. This echoes Catherine 
Charrett’s claim that, ‘securitisation is maintained through its own ritualised mechanisms of 
measuring and judging the performance of the marked threat.’73 Taking these repetitive aspects a 
step further she argues that securitizing actors find it difficult to step outside their prior ‘discursive 
order’ or provide dissenting views.74 Understanding securitization in this way, however, downplays 
and precludes the constant possibility for contestation and even fissures in the ritual. As Ido Oren 
and Ty Solomon note, ‘the audience is not akin to students in an academic lecture hall or to 
theatergoers who are mostly performed to.” 75  As such, their discussion of ritual allows for 
multivocality and, in turn, contestation since, ‘the complexity and uncertainty of securitising 
phrases thus make it possible for them to be adopted and chanted by people who do not share 
political values and who do not see eye to eye on the securitisation of the issue at stake.’76  
Two implications follow from this section. First, CSH calls attention to how certain 
securitized stories become ritualized and collectively remembered. Second, it establishes that there 
is no straightforward way to understand how history is securitized or desecuritized a particular 
point in time or in a particular place. Looking at such dynamics is likely to make CSH be a valuable 
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Recollecting Historicity and Critical Security History in 
Ontological Security Studies 
 
 Ontological security studies (OSS) is another evolving field in critical security studies.77 
As Stuart Croft notes, “it has become as multidisciplinary work space”.78 Overall these debates 
focus on the practices through which agents order their environments and their Selves. As Steele 
suggests, ‘[…] the mere act of recognizing ourselves is the first of many in a process meant to 
extract who we are from what surrounds us.79 Of course, narration is an act of representation – not 
only of the Self (as fleeting as that may be) but of others and all within the social environment. It 
allows actors to acquire and maintain a consistent biographical narrative and identity, even if they 
are harmful or self-defeating.80  
Yet the striving for ontological security does not guarantee its attainment. The chaos and 
speed of late modernity, and bewildering variety of methods and avenues for representation and 
counter-representation, place any narrative ordering under constant attack. Within OSS these 
critical situations are theorized as moments of ‘radical disjunctions of an unpredictable kind 
affecting substantial numbers of individuals’, disturbing the routines so vital to ordering the Self 
and (with) its environment.81 Such critical situations – likened to the crises theorized in IR - disrupt 
narratives and conceptualizations of the Self.82 In these moments, new models or analogies can take 
hold for agents seeking to re-order the Self in the face of a critical situation, lest identity be upended 
altogether. 
 Two key concepts within Giddensian-inspired uses of OSS relate to CSH, namely 
(auto)biographical narratives and ‘historicity’ (the use of history to make history). The biographical 
narrative is what Giddens also terms the ‘‘narrative of the self’’: the story or stories through which 
                                                 
77 For excellent overviews of the pluralistic debates taking place here see Catarina Kinnvall and Jennifer Mitzen, ‘An 
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self-identity is reflexively understood, both by the individual concerned and by others.83 In general, 
OSS has centralised this aspect from both conventional (taking the narrative as an analytical given) 
and critical (treating it as a politically problematic device) angles.84 Less acknowledged but still 
found in OSS work is the concept of historicity.85 For Giddens two conditions of modernity are 
responsible for the ‘use of history to make history’.86 The first is literacy and the development of 
the printing press.87 The second is the importance of electronic communication that made the 
retrieval of information and, in turn, everyday meanings possible. According to Giddens, these two 
trend spur agents to use history to create and maintain ontological security. In short, historical ties 
reduce the anxiety and fears produced by critical situations.88   
Championing a complex understanding of CSH, however, opens up four new lines of 
inquiry for OSS scholars interested in historicity. First, it reminds us that the process of narrating 
history is an expression of agency that transcends a singular level of analysis or socialization. As 
Friedrich Kratochwil notes, “while history cannot be the ‘‘teacher’’ of all things practical, the 
critical reflection on our historicity is an indispensable precondition for grasping our predicament 
as agents”.89 Second, adopting a CSH lens allow us to appreciate that ‘history’ itself is an actant, a 
collective force exerting pressure upon individuals and groups. This assertion requires some 
clarification since ‘agency’ is typically assumed to be both the property and outcome of human 
action. At the broadest level, “we need to start theorizing […] assemblages of non-human and 
human actants”. 90  Agency thus needs to be considered, “not just in terms of human or 
intersubjective intentionality … but as a kind of emergent swarm effect’.91 This effect is similar to 
what we speak of when referring to how the ‘weight’ of the ‘past’ influences the present. The core 
point is not to occlude the role of humans. What it does mean is that the long-lasting consequences 
of our actions in any moment can be judged by history. This is the background against which the 
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trail of former Bosnian Serb commander Ratko Mladić should be seen, although some years on the 
ground has shifted fundamentally.92  
 Third, OSS focuses on the ways in which insecurity is generated by a whole host of factors 
not all connected to ‘conventional’ security stories. Just like its ability to order a social world that 
seems chaotic and beyond our control, narratives (including master narratives) help order a past 
that seems endless and infinite in its details and trajectories. Ontological insecurity about the 
present can thus be attended to through with a connection to the past. Fourth, and related, OSS calls 
our attention to the politics of identity involved in the making of history, and why the dynamics of 
causal narratives regarding specific historical events is about more than ‘just’ those events. To 
begin, they are about narrating a past Self as an aspirational one. As Steele noted, ‘historical 
narratives function to order and routinize the Self of individuals and collectives’.93 In doing so, they 
can, ‘paper over particular urges. These urges can be ever-so-slightly revealed when narratives are 
disturbed, including emotional drives connected to notions of revenge and lost honor’.94  
Taking all of these points into consideration, a CSH approach drawn from OSS has to not 
only be aware of the importance of narratives for all agents who engage them for organizing the 
past in the context of a security-seeking present. It also has to acknowledge recent critiques that 
have emerged within ontological security studies over problems of narration. 95 First, narratives are 
exclusive not only of the events that they select against others but also of the others against which 
the narrative finds its political power. Already Will K. Delehanty and Brent J. Steele have pointed 
out the importance of gender in the constitution of biographical narratives of political communities. 
Chris Rossdale goes further, suggesting that the, “contiguous and stable narratives of selfhood, can 
(violently) obscure the ways in which such narratives are themselves implicated in power 
relations”.96 Elsewhere Nick Vaughan-Williams has called for a ‘hauntological security’ approach, 
‘that pays keen interest in what is left out, unsaid, excluded, and/or undermined in service of claims 
made to secure a biographical narrative of the self’.97 This requires looking into how, “fixing a 
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the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague of 10 offences involving extermination, murder and persecution of civilian 
populations. See The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, ‘ICTY convicts Ratko Mladić for 
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity’ (2017): Available at <http://www.icty.org/en/press/icty-convicts-
ratko-mladi%C4%87-for-genocide-war-crimes-and-crimes-against-humanity > (accessed 21/09/18).  
93 Steele, Critical Security History and Hiroshima’, p.306. 
94 Ibid., p. 305 
95See Chris Rossdale, ‘Enclosing Critique: The Limits of Ontological Security’, International Political Sociology, 9:4 
(2015), p. 369-386; Christopher Browning and Pertti Joenniemi, ‘Ontological security, Self-articulation and the 
Securitization of Identity’, Cooperation and Conflict, 52: 1(2017), p.31-47. 
96 Rossdale, Enclosing critique, 369. 
97 Nick Vaughan-Williams, ‘Border (In)Securities, ‘Regular’ Populations, and the Mediterranean Crisis: The Vernacular, 
the Everyday, and the Ontological’, Paper presented at the ISA Convention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA, 16-19 March (2016), 
p. 26. 
 16 
certain understanding of the past and defending it may take the form of active forgetting and/or 
remembering”. 98  
CSH opens up a striking way for these recent critiques within or against OSS to gain 
continual momentum, especially the recent attempts to problematize the notion of a coherent ‘Self’ 
being possible in the first place.99  While OSS scholars simplify the link between ontological 
security and history to biographic narratives and routines, CSH calls attention to some of the 
broader ‘stakes’ of those links. Building on the previous sections, it seeks to highlight the 
importance of reinstating the fine line between who speaks and who is silenced. Some of the work 
on vernacular security is already making progress in this direction,100 demonstrating the ways in 
which ‘political discourses’ can ‘disrupt dominant understandings of threat and insecurity’.101  




How to ‘do’ Critical Security History: An Illustration of ‘Engaged 
Historical Amateurism’  
 
So far this article has highlighted that securitization and ontological security scholars could 
benefit from engaging with a CSH approach. But what about the actual ‘doing’ of CSH? How can 
scholars, students and everyday people ‘do’ this type of work?  On the surface, CSH appears to 
leave us with several dilemmas. The first pertains to the near impossibility of studying historical 
narratives ‘critically’ when they are always incomplete and in the process of becoming. The second 
hinges on methodological challenges pertaining to where and how this kind of work should be 
done. Of course, as scholars, we would focus on the practicing CSH in our studies. However, in 
reality, it can be ‘done’ almost anywhere.  
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Although this article does not attempt to overcome these dilemmas, we do believe do that 
CSH is still a useful approach in thinking about how to address them. As previous sections have 
already shown, the role of history forces us to pay closer attention to the ambiguities, 
inconsistencies and uncertainties that constantly reside in and shape an array of narratives. This 
awareness is already critical. In another way, it nudges those interested in ‘doing’ CSH to 
unapologetically embrace pluralistic methodologies and multidisciplinary outlooks.102 Following 
Claudia Aradau, Jef Huysmans, Andrew Neal and Nadine Voelkner we would advise people not to 
rush to define what a method is before they use it.103 Ultimately each actor who uses a CSH 
approach will have to be reflexive enough to acknowledge that, “all methods are in a sense 
historical”.104 In this respect, we find that Halvard Leira’s advice to embrace a ‘spirit of engaged 
amateurism in dealing with history’105 provides a vitally important sensibility for pursuing CSH. 
Applied here, amateurism is a recognition that we are more equipped that we realise to engage 
history as a social, and even collegial, activity. 
In no particular order, we would suggest three entangled steps for ‘doing’ CSH. These steps 
would include, first, finding the master narrative being invoked/evoked. This is perhaps the most 
straight-forward step. Nevertheless, it still requires careful documentation and/or citation and 
reflexive analysis on the part of the actor. On a constant basis they must ask, is this the ‘only story’ 
that could be told about the event in question. 106 In the first instance, discourse analysis, oral 
histories and ethnography may provide useful methods for identifying and unpacking the master 
narratives and the dominant themes that emerge wherever they reside. 
A related step is to try establish the particular causal factors ‘at play’ in the master 
narrative.107 Interpretivist ‘process-tracing’ appears to be a suitable beginning point to investigate 
the powerful role that causal claims in securitized realms.108 Care must be take here. Let us recall, 
the goal of CSH is not to establish causality or determination per se. The goal is to examine how 
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causal narratives persuade people that certain historical events happened in a certain way. What 
follows is the daunting task of discovering how this happened. This step is difficult. Master-
narratives maintain a seemingly concrete authority.  By extension, it is likely that doing CSH will 
involve traveling, “through a winding path that touches on core issues related to memories, with 
many side trails and detours”.109 However, the third step is to remain alert to fissures that are always 
possible in these master-narratives once we travel down these winding paths.110  Importantly, 
routinized and ritualized security seeking actions and relationships can be disturbed precisely 
because they have gone unquestioned for so long, lacking a type of flexibility and adaptability in 
the face of questioning. 
The 2012 Sarajevo Red Line is a good illustration of the complexity of trying to ‘do’ CSH. 
To commemorate the twenty anniversary of the start of the Bosnian war, 11,541 empty red chairs 
were carefully placed in 825 rows on Titova street in Sarajevo to create a ‘red river’111 seen in the 
two figures below.112 The installation, designed by Haris Pašoviü, was dedicated to the Sarajevo 
citizens killed during the 1992-96 siege of their city.113 Each red chair was there to symbolize a life 
lost during the siege. Poignantly, “a teddy bear, toys, and schoolbooks were placed on the smaller 
ones that symbolize the hundreds of children killed during the four-year siege by Serbian forces.”114  
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This temporary installation illustrates the inherent difficulties of leaving what happened 
‘then’ in the past. As Katelyn E. Giovannucci writes, “Red plastic chairs seem so simple, but 11, 
541 of them can be overwhelming. A stage full of performers also seems ordinary, but the fact that 
they are playing to a dead audience is anything but that”. 115 What is equally apparent in this 
particular case is how older securitization stories and biographic narratives are passed down from 
one generation to the next. These active processes of collective (re)telling reaffirm that 
desecuritization is difficult to achieve. For example, although the installation presented an 
opportunity to commemorate those who had died, the effects made it hard to ignore the issues of 
trauma, loss and victimhood it raised. 
Trying to remember what happened in the streets of Sarajevo complicate any attempts to 
split securitizing and desecuritizing plotlines or determine what counts as a ‘prior’ experience. In 
reality, we cannot rule out the possibility this space may always contain securitized stories even if 
they change over time. Put differently, peace and war may have to coexist awkwardly. This may 
make us uncomfortable. It is not the typical way we have been socialized into thinking about peace, 
(de)securitization or ontological (in)security. However, this article has already shown that memory, 
securitization and historicity intersect in ways that does not guarantee stability. Their 
interrelationship are ambiguous precisely because no guidelines exist a priori. 
Adopting a CSH perspective, it is important to acknowledge what we do not see or hear in these 
images. To be sure, “the photograph provides a quick way of apprehending something and a 
compact form for memorizing it”.116  In contexts like Bosnia, however, they also have the potential 
to perpetuate threat perceptions and ontological insecurity. Rather than trying to run away from this 
reality CSH allows for the possibility that these images will affect certain groups and individuals 
in different ways and at different times. Other questions also arise. What do these images tell us 
about the conflict? Whose stories do they tell? Whose chair is missing? 117 What remains invisible 
in these snapshots? Do they allow us to access the soundscape of the choir, classical music and 750 
school children signing during this commemoration? Did this commemoration create reconciliation 
and desecuritization? Time should be dedicated to answering these questions in the classroom, 
conference and everyday sites. More broadly, we need to be realistic enough in these conversations 
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to realise that these images can only ever attempt to convey a snapshot of a much larger picture that 
we may never fully know, see, feel or touch. 
On some level, CSH provides security scholars with is way to address this reality. It opens a 
pathway for histories, identities and memories to remain insecure.  From a linguistic perspective, 
this approach acknowledges that speech acts and (de)securitization can empower certain speaker 
while diluting the voice of others.118 Equally it confronts the question of silence from another angle. 
As notes Jay Winter imagery can (and frequently does) escape the confines of written language. 
The Sarajevo Red line is a strong example of how visuals demand attention.119 Perhaps, however, 
we need to take this idea further. On a deeper level, this memorial reflects that history has a 
mysterious ability to stir emotions that transcend any singular medium, time or place. Viewed in 
this way, the Sarajevo Red Line offers us a glimpse into a different kind of storytelling, one that is 
open to contestation as much as causation. As the ReCall project has already stated, “this points to 
the need for every individual to take critical responsibility […] for envisioning new ways of 
handling painful places and stories”.120 For us, adopting a CSH approach may provide one stepping 
stone in that direction.  
 
Continued and Continual CSH Conversations  
Security and history are topics that people will perennially encounter. Despite our best 
efforts, we cannot leave either of them behind. Evidently, the end of the Cold War continues to 
shape disciplinary debates in security studies and public perceptions fear in ways that are hard to 
measure. As John Gerard Ruggie argues, “the year 1989 has already become a convenient historical 
marker […] to indicate the end of the postwar era”.121 Reflecting on how the ‘war on terrorism’ 
was constructed Richard Jackson also suggests that this phrase has become, “accepted as part of 
the way things naturally are and should be”.122 Throughout this article, we have shown that such 
master-narratives helps to ensure ontological security, routines and identities. As such, they often, 
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“become a powerful tool for authorities as well as other social groups to preserve certain memories 
and conceal others”.123   
Our aim in this article has been to develop a CSH approach that can question master-
narratives. We can see from the example of the Bosnian conflict that there is no automaticity in 
how security stories are told or remembered. This gives us room to unsettle and potentially 
transform the engrained assumptions about well-known historical events. At the same time, we 
have been careful not to leapfrog over the question of causality altogether. CSH openly 
acknowledges that reified, routinized and ritualized narrative have, “fostered certainty about how 
one could define, prosecute and win future conflicts”. 124Given that causal narratives play an 
important role in developing that certainty, it is not enough to simply try to substitute one cause 
with another cause or foreground agency.  
This focus has broader implications for security studies. In the first instance, this article 
adds substantially to our understanding of securitization and ontological security studies. By 
foregrounding the powerful role that history continues to play in the social construction of threats 
fear, we contributed to recent efforts to frame (de)securitization as an ongoing process with no clear 
beginning or ending. Rather than assuming that actors can successfully close one securitization 
story or split simultaneous (de)securitizing moves, we need to be vigilant and open-minded when 
it comes to putting ambiguity rather than causality at the center of discussions about ritualized 
histories, commemorations and contexts.  
An additional promise we have identified in this article is the ability of CSH to unsettle 
biographic narratives and identities that hold special significance because they offer a “useable 
past”.125 In this respect, it can contribute to recent trends in OSS to investigate the history, memory 
and emotions via the concept of nostalgia.126 Our analysis has also shown that CSH opens up a way 
for more research to be done on the concept of historicity. This connects to recent attempts in OSS 
to problematize the notion of a coherent ‘Self’ being possible in the first place.  
It also seems quite clear that a fuller understanding of CSH necessitates cultivating ‘a spirit 
of engaged amateurism’127 that can be practiced in a wide variety of micropolitical settings. In this 
                                                 
123  Sarah H. Awad, ‘Document a Contested Memory: Symbols in the Changing City Space of Cairo’, Culture & 
Psychology, 23:2 (2017), p. 234-254 
124 Barbara J. Falk and Paul T. Mitchell, ‘The Last Good War?: The Lingering Impact of World War II Epistemology 
and Ontology in Conflict and Popular Culture”, Critical Studies on Security, 3:3 (2015), p. 291. 
125 Dmitry Chernobrov, ‘Ontological Security and Public (Mis)Recognition of International Crises: Uncertainty, 
Political Imagining and the Self ’, Political Psychology 37:5 (2016), p. 385 
 
126 See Amir Lupovici, The Power of Deterrence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), p. 69; Mira 
Sucharov, ‘Imagining ourselves then and now: Nostalgia and Canadian multiculturalism’, Journal of International 
Relations and Development, 16: 4(2013), p. 544. 
127 Leira, International Relations Pluralism and History, p. 23-31. 
 23 
light, events that unfold in our research conversations with fellow scholars, students and even 
strangers hold implications for exploring how master-narratives are learnt, told, remembered and 
challenged. Moreover, we believe that the critical security studies approaches that we could not 
cover in this paper offer versatile entry points to study and ‘do’ CSH in a number of relational 
spaces and interconnected sites. Taking this invitation seriously creates another avenue of future 
research; the silences that all stories produce and the (in)visibility of who is left out. To illustrate 
why these issues matter to CSH it is worthwhile to return briefly to what happened and is happening 
in Bosnia.  
Using the two photographs of the 2012 Sarajevo Red Line project, we demonstrated that 
history and security are interconnected in complex ways. In this context, their interplay pushes us 
to reconsider how justice and reconciliation can be achieved in this region. As Jasna Dragovic-Soso 
notes, “the history of the failed TRC project in Bosnia holds important lessons for ongoing truth-
seeking attempts”.128 Further research needs to be done to uncover how past atrocities will be 
collectively remembered, narrated and contested in Bosnia. Looking ahead, it is not clear whether 
overt practices of memorialization will upset and discredit official attempts to narrate this conflict 
as something that happened in the past. Our analysis definitely speaks to a more complex story of 
desecuritization and biographical continuity, one that pays tribute to the unassailable struggles over 
the senses of wrong and injustices produced to establish an “official history/memory”.129  
All of this bring us back to where we began. Quite unexpectedly, Valentin Inzko 
premonitions may have come at precisely the right time. If we listen, they testify to the 
unmistakably difficulties of burying, “traumatic fragments that still defy narrative reconstruction 
and exceed comprehension.”130 Instead of implying that a harmonious community can be restored 
in Bosnia, CSH endorses a multivocal and multiperspectivst approaches that elides any, ‘policing’ 
mentality that denotes the limitations of what is sayable or thinkable and the boundaries beyond 
which the unsayable lies”. 131 In this effort, we invite readers to constantly question who is narrating 
security stories and history in this context and elsewhere. Is it a speaker? Or an image? Or a chair? 
Or history itself?  
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